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Abstract
This paper assesses the spillover e↵ect of European Patent Boxes on a l-
iates of MNEs operating in Austria and Germany. I divide firms in a control
and treatment group, the latter having a liates in countries where preferen-
tial regimes for patent and other IP income have been introduced between
2005-2011. My findings suggest that Austrian and German firms, which have
gained indirect access to preferential IP regimes via their a liates, reduce
their reported profit levels. I do not observe, however, an e↵ect on the level of
intangible assets owned by these firms.
⇤I would like to thank Martin Zagler, Daniel Shaviro, Sebastian Beer, Christian Saborowski,
Erik von Uexkull, Miriam Bruhn, and Norbert Roller for their helpful comments. All remaining
errors and inaccuracies are, of course, my own.
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1 Introduction
Intellectual property (IP) is widely seen as an increasingly important driver of pros-
perity and policy-makers have implemented ambitious programs aimed at strength-
ening the Knowledge Based Economy and the creation of Knowledge Based Capital
(OECD (2013)). With IP being highly mobile – both its development and, often more
relevant, its ownership are a central element of tax planning strategies in multina-
tional enterprises (Evers and Spengel (2014)) – its attraction and promotion is an
area of global tax competition.
Whether this competition is desirable is a matter of debate; Concerns about a
downward race to the bottom eroding tax bases (OECD (2014)) can be countered by
a case for restricting competition to areas with the highest mobility in order to limit
distortions to the general tax regime (Keen (2001)). In practice, the desirability
of innovation-based business activity has triggered the development of a range of
tailored tax policy tools to encourage investments and/or the relocation of intangible
assets.
Over the past decades, countries have typically employed Research and Devel-
opment (R&D) incentives aimed at promoting the creation of intangibles. A broad
literature assesses the e↵ectiveness of such instruments in di↵erent contexts, suggest-
ing that there are sizable e↵ects for tax allowances or credits in encouraging R&D
(Bloom et al. (2002); Hall and Van Reenen (2000)).
More recently, several countries have introduced preferential IP regimes, labeled
as Patent Boxes, which o↵er reduced tax rates for income that firms declare to be
derived from patents and, in some cases, other forms of IP. As opposed to targeting
research, these new policy tools aim at the income stemming from the commercial-
ization of IP. Less is known on the e↵ectiveness of IP regimes. Investigating general
e↵ects of low patent income tax rates on IP location, Dischinger and Riedel (2011)
find that intangible asset holdings are distorted towards low-tax subsidiaries in multi-
national groups. They look at di↵erences in the statutory tax rates of a liates across
an MNE group, and account for patent box regimes by lowering the assumed cor-
porate income tax rate operating in countries with preferential regimes. Karkinsky
and Riedel (2012)) and Gri th, Miller and OConnell (2014) show that patent reg-
istration is sensitive to corporate tax rates. Ernst, Richter and Riedel (2014) report
that jurisdictions with lower tax rates attract patent applications of higher quality
and corresponding revenue streams. Looking at European firms, Boehm, Karkinsky
and Riedel (2012) demonstrate that a significant share of patent applications in low
tax countries such as Ireland and Switzerland have been developed abroad. Focusing
directly on the introduction of Patent Boxes in European Countries, Evers et al.
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(2014) demonstrate that preferential IP regimes substantially reduce e↵ective tax
burdens, with the treatment of expenses and definition and determination of eligible
income having similar importance as the nominal tax rates being o↵ered. They con-
clude that while a Patent Box may attract mobile investment, these regimes tend
to be poorly targeted at encouraging additional investment activity. In a simulation
exercise, Gri th et al. (2014) estimate country specific semi-elasticities of patent
applications to income taxation and provide approximations of the e↵ect of patent
box regimes introduced in Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the UK. They
find that the expected increase in patent ownership is insu cient to o↵set revenue
losses stemming from preferential tax treatment.
This paper aims to add to this emerging body of work by using a di↵erent ana-
lytical perspective and approach in investigating the e↵ect of preferential IP regimes
in Europe. Rather than measuring the e↵ect of preferential regimes on the tax base
and stock of intangible assets located in the place of the policy innovation, I focus
on the e↵ect of patent boxes on firms operating in two European countries without
preferential treatment for IP, Germany and Austria. Relying on a di↵erence-in-
di↵erences framework to compare German and Austrian multinational subsidiaries
with related entities in countries that have introduced IP Regimes to those who have
no such a liates, I find evidence of reduced reported pre-tax profit levels among both
Austrian and German firms, which have access to newly introduced Patent Boxes
abroad through an a liated party. I do not, however, find evidence of the reloca-
tion of intangible assets among these subsidiaries, possibly due to legal restrictions.
These initial findings point towards two intriguing dynamics that warrant further
investigation. First, they provide some support to concerns on potential tax base
spillovers in international corporate taxation (IMF (2014)) in the case of preferential
IP taxation. Second, short-term MNE tax planning in response to preferential IP
regimes may be more reliant on manipulating value estimates and associated license
and royalty payments, than on the transfer of legal ownership rights.
2 Background & Motivation
Currently, 12 European countries operate a preferential regime for income from In-
tellectual Property,1 with discussions on a possible introduction ongoing in several
others. The typical stated objective for these policies is to ensure that a country
remains an attractive destination for innovative activities, linked to high skilled jobs
1Portugal is the latest country to introduce a Patent Box in 2014. Irelands preferential regime
was phased out in 2011. Italy introduced legislation in 2014, but its regime is not yet operational.
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driving technological innovation and growth.2 The spread of similar regimes across
Europe since the early 2000s also suggests a competitive dynamic among countries.
Table 1: Summary of IP Box Regimes in Europe
Country Introduction CIT Rate IP Rate EATR⇤
Belgium 2007 34 6,8 -27.14
France 2000 33,33 15 -7,65
Ireland 1973⇤⇤ 12,5 2,5 n.a.
Italy 2015⇤⇤⇤ 27.5 13,75 n.a.
Liechtenstein 2011 12,5 2,5 1.39
Luxembourg 2008 29,63 5,72 5.47
Malta 2010 35 0 0
Netherlands 2007 25 5 3.75
Portugal 2014 23 11,5 n.a.
Switzerland⇤⇤⇤⇤ 2011 20,60 8,8 9,5
Spain 2008 30 10 -4.01⇤⇤⇤⇤⇤
Hungary 2003 19 9,5 n.a.
United Kingdom 2012 22 10 7,5
Cyprus 2011 10 0 -6.64
Largely based on: Evers et al. 2014; Additional Informationen taken from: Deutscher Bundestag
Drucksache 18/1238 (2014) and PwC Country Reports.
⇤E↵ective average tax rate estimated by Evers et al. 2014
⇤⇤Abolished in 2011.
⇤⇤⇤Legislation introduced in 2014, regime not yet operational. Benefits of the regime will increase
gradually from 2015-2017.
⇤⇤⇤⇤Canton Nidwalden.
⇤⇤⇤⇤⇤ Based on IP rate of 15 percent.
The specifics of IP regimes di↵er across a range of important design elements,
a↵ecting the attractiveness of regimes to stimulate the development of new IP, as well
as a regime’s pull for the relocation of existing assets. Irrespective of the relative focus
of a regime, there is, however, a common concern that positive e↵ects of attracting
IP from a receiving country’s perspective come at the expense of other countries
losing some of their R&D activities, ownership, and returns.
MNEs can use cross-border tax planning strategies to take advantage of benefits
2See, for instance, Vickers: The UK Patent Box, IV Presentation Vienna, 19.11.2014; Essers:
Research and Development The Netherlands, IV Presentation Vienna, 19.11.2014.
4
of preferential regimes in any of the countries where they are active.3 Evers and
Spengel (2014) discuss di↵erent routes for tax planning involving intangible assets.
Di↵erentiating the development and ownership of IP assets can be achieved by allo-
cating IP to holding companies in low tax jurisdiction in a direct transfer of ownership
or by using contract R&D arrangements. Alternatively, licensing arrangements often
provide room for allocating profits to low tax jurisdictions. From an MNE perspec-
tive, maximizing the share of income accruing in a patent box jurisdiction ensures
a higher after tax return. At the same time, the costs of intangible asset creation
should ideally be located in a high tax jurisdiction, unless they need to be collocated
to ensure that income is eligible for preferential treatment.4 Consequently, a range
of MNE responses to the introduction of patent boxes abroad could be expected.
These include changes (i.) in the pricing strategy to remunerate a liated owners of
intangibles through higher license and royalty payments by subsidiaries not benefit-
ing from preferential treatment; (ii.) alterations to the total level of investment in
R&D, with expected increases given higher after tax returns; and (iii.) adjustments
to the allocation of investments (given that the share of intangible inputs is mobile).
This paper is a first attempt to assess the impact, or spillover, of such strategies on
a liates operating in Austria and Germany.
3 Sample selection & descriptives
I obtain firm-level micro data of German and Austrian MNE a liates from the OR-
BIS database, compiled, standardized, and commercially o↵ered by Bureau Van Dijk
(BvD). Selecting German and Austrian firms with unconsolidated accounts, I extract
financial information on these firms as well as details on the location of all a liated
companies, i.e. subsidiaries and immediate parents as well as on the ultimate owner.
About 84 percent of the firms in the sample are based in Germany, and 16 percent
located in Austria. A visual depiction of the distribution of observations across in-
dustries (using the first and second NACE code digits) shows a fairly similar spread
in both countries.
I extract the following firm level variables reported in ORBIS: EBIT, intangible
assets,5 fixed assets, and turnover during the time period from 2005-2011, providing
3Whereas firms that not part of a MNE group may be at a competitive disadvantage for exploit-
ing their R&D activities, possibly undermining innovation dynamics For instance, when smaller
firms have particular advantages in creating radical innovations (OECD (2013).
4This would be the case under the nexus approach currently discussed as part of the OECDs
work on harmful tax practices.
5Including formation expenses, research expenses, goodwill, development expenses and other
5
Figure 1: Distribution across Industries in Austria and Germany
The majority of a liates in the sample operate in the trade (32%) and manufacturing (22%) sectors.
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seven years of firm specific information. My data set consists of a total of 8,203 firms,
after removing a liates with poor data.6
Table 2: Sample Description – German A liates
Variables observations mean sd min max
Fixed Assets 31,667 47,281 592,104 0 4,880,000
Intangible Assets 30,446 2,036 18,098 1 942,668
EBIT 26,077 8,828 43,732 0 1,746,128
Turnover 27,222 155,508 950,652 0 8,230,000
Notes: Fixed Assets, Intangible Assets and EBIT in thousand EUR.
Table 3: Sample Description – Austrian A liates
Variables observations mean sd min max
Fixed Assets 6,086 41,579 171,370 0 3,688,525
Intangible Assets 5,896 1,874 15,557 1 384,044
EBIT 5,088 7,279 25,275 0 609,600
Turnover 5,526 117,879 360,599 0 8,168,871
Notes: Fixed Assets, Intangible Assets and EBIT in thousand EUR.
About 13.3 percent of the firms in my sample have access to a patent box regime
through a subsidiary, immediate parent, or the ultimate owner. A total of 4260
observations fall into the treatment category following the introduction of a prefer-
ential regime in an a liate’s jurisdiction. Overall, subsidiaries with a liates located
in countries where patent boxes have been introduced posted higher profit levels in
Germany and, to a lesser extend, Austria. The peak in absolute levels is around
2007-2008, before the onset of the financial crisis. The distribution of EBIT and
Intangible Assets is, however, considerably skewed and has thick tails. Following a
transformation using the natural logarithm of EBIT, broadly similar trends can be
observed.
expenses with a long-term e↵ect.
6Negative entries for fixed assets, intangible asset and turnover. I also drop one outlier with no
reported assets, sta↵ or subsidiaries in any year of my sample and a single EBIT entry of more than
22 Billion Euro in 2011.
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Figure 2: Development of EBIT and Log EBIT among Austrian and German a liates
with/without indirect PB access
Notes: PB access refers to firms with a liates in BE, ES, NL, MT, CY, LU, LI
Corresponding to the higher level of reported profits, the overall stock of intan-
gible assets among firms with a liates in Patent Box countries tends to be higher
than for other MNE subsidiaries operating in Germany and at comparable levels in
Austria. The ratio of intangible to fixed assets is, however, noticeably lower among
these Austrian firms during the timeframe of the analysis.
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Figure 3: Development of Log Intangible Assets and the Ratio of Intangible to Fixed
Assets among Austrian and German a liates with/without indirect PB access
Notes: PB access refers to firms with a liates in BE, ES, NL, MT, CY, LU, LI
4 Estimation approach
To estimate the spill-over e↵ect of Patent Box introductions in the late-2000s on
MNE operations in Austria and Germany, I rely on a Di↵erences-in-Di↵erences (DD)
framework, comparing Austrian and German MNE group members that have related
entities in countries with newly introduced IP regimes to Austrian and German
subsidiaries without a liates in these countries.
I first identify subsidiaries with a liates in Belgium, the Netherlands, Liechten-
stein, Luxemburg, Malta, Cyprus, and Spain, and then create an interaction with
the years following the introduction of a patent box in each country. This dummy
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variable always takes the value of one when a firm has access to another subsidiary,
immediate parent, or ultimate owner with a patent box that was introduced during
the time frame captured in the panel. If, for example, a subsidiary in my sample
has an a liate in Belgium or the Netherlands, the dummy takes the value of one
from 2007 onwards. In the case of companies operating with related entities in Spain
or Luxemburg, the same holds for the years from 2008 onwards. In cases where
a German or Austrian entity has a subsidiary in Belgium and Spain, the dummy
captures the earlier regime’s introduction. Figure 4 below illustrates the division of
companies into treatment and control groups based on the year when a Patent Box
was introduced.
Figure 4: Illustration of treatment and control groups
Notes: Red line depicts the year when a patent box was introduced in the a liates (dotted line)
jurisdiction.
The idea of the DD method is to control for factors that are constant over time
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among the companies that are operating in countriesthat have introduced a new
regime during the timeframe captured in the panel,7 and to compare changes in
their intangible assets and reported profits to a comparison group of firms without
a liates operating in these countries. A basic assumption for the DD design is thus
that these outcomes would follow an equal trend for both types of firms in the absence
of the introduction of IP regimes.
The intuitiveness of a DD approach and its quasi-experimental nature come at
the cost of a lack in precision. In light of the important di↵erences in scope and
attractiveness of these regimes (Evers et al. (2014)), the integration of all firms with
a liates across the di↵erent countries that have introduced Patent Box regimes is a
rather blunt approximation. It does, however, provide an interesting starting point to
assess spill-over e↵ects on a more granular basis. Integrating fixed e↵ects estimators,
the approach allows me to control for observable and unobservable time-invariant
characteristics in the two sets of companies. Adding year dummies captures time
shocks a↵ecting all German and Austrian firms in the sample.
In my baseline regression, I estimate the following OLS model:
lnYit =  1(PBaccessit ⇤ PostIntroit) + µi + ⌧t + ✏it (1)
Subscripts i and t indicate the firm and the time period (year), Yit being the
logarithmic transformation of EBIT and intangible assets8. I adopt firm fixed e↵ects
µi, to control for non-observable characteristics at the firm level that are constant
over time,9 and year fixed e↵ects ⌧t. For additional estimations, I add a vector of
firm level control variables X (turnover, fixed assets) to the regression specification
(1).
7Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein, Spain, Malta and Cyprus.
8Since the distribution for the two dependent variables Intangible Assets and EBIT is notice-
ably skewed, I employ a logarithmic transformation of both variables. Following previous work
(Dischinger and Riedel (2011)), I add a constant of 1 to the intangibles variable in order to keep
zero-observations in the sample.
9A Hausman test suggests that a fixed e↵ects approach is preferable to random e↵ects.
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The standalone e↵ect of PBaccess is constant over time and thus captured by
the firm-specific fixed e↵ects. My main interest is in the sign and significance of the
 1 parameters, which can be interpreted as a di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimator as
illustrated below:
Define PBaccess ⇤ PostIntro = D; and the expected change in EBIT/IntAssets
of subsidiary i, which has access to a Patent Box in year t by:
 PB = E(logYit|D = 1)  E(logY(it 1)|D = 0) =  1 + ⌧t   ⌧t 1 (2)
Similarly define the di↵erence for subsidiary j, which does not have access through
a subsidiary in a Patent Box Country by:
 noPB = E(logYjt|D = 0)  E(logY(jt 1)|D = 0) = ⌧t   ⌧t 1 (3)
Substracting shows that  1 indicates the di↵erence between those changes:
 noPB   PB =  1 (4)
5 Results
Table 3 shows the results of the estimation of baseline equation (1), with the log-
arithm of EBIT as dependent variable. The variable PBa*postIntro captures in-
direct e↵ects of Patent Box regimes on Austrian subsidiaries and the combination
of PBa*postIntro and the interaction PBa*postIntroDE the same e↵ect on German
companies. The first specification is a pure baseline, indicating a significant negative
e↵ect of indirect patent box access on reported profits in Austria and Germany. In
the second specification, the reported turnover and fixed assets are added as firm
level controls. Both factors are significant in explaining reported profit (intangible
asset) levels, and are therefore maintained for the following specifications.
The results of the first and second specification suggest that reported profits fall
by around 22%-28% in Austria among subsidiaries that gain indirect access to a
Patent Box. In Germany, the observed e↵ect ranges between 7%-9%.10 The elastic-
ity of EBIT with respect to Fixed Assets captured by the coe cient lFixedAssets
suggests that a 10 percent increase in Fixed Assets increases EBIT by 0.3%, when
turnover is held constant. Increasing Turnover by 10% increases EBIT by 8.3%,
assuming everything else remains equal.
10I can reject the linear restriction that PBa ⇤postIntro+PBa ⇤PostIntroDE = 0 at a 5% and
10% confidence level for the first and second specifications.
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The year e↵ects (not depicted) show that in comparison to the baseline of 2005,
profits rose among the firms in my sample in both Germany and Austria before the
financial crisis. At the beginning of the crisis in 2008, profits fell relative to 2006 and
2007, but started to recover in 2010. In all of my specifications, I allow year e↵ects
to di↵er across Austria and Germany.
In the third (fourth) specification, I interact dummy variables taking the value
of 1 if a subsidiary has a domestic ultimate owner (owns at least one patent) with
my PBa*postIntro variable. In both cases, I find no significant e↵ects. Finally,
I rerun specification (2) after dropping all a liates belonging to a comparatively
small MNE group with 20 or less firms. Results remain largely unchanged. In all of
my specifications I rely on robust standard errors, allowing for a general correlation
structure within firms.
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Table 4: Baseline Estimation, EBIT, Fixed E↵ects, 2005-2011
Dependent Variable: Log EBIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Firm Controls Domestic Owner Patent Owner Large MNEs
PBa*postIntro -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.28*** -0.24** -0.29***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
PBa*postIntroDE 0.19** 0.23** 0.20* 0.16 0.20*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
lTurnover 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.82***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
lFixedAssets 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
IntpostIntro*DomOwner -0.15
(0.29)
IntpostIntro*PatOwner -0.21
(0.20)
Observations 31,163 28,430 28,430 28,430 22,814
R-squared 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Number of firms 6,676 6,460 6,460 6,460 5,135
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Using a similar set of specifications and the logarithmic transformation of intan-
gibles as a dependent variable (Table 4), I find no significant e↵ect of Patent Box
access on the intangible asset endowment of Austrian and German subsidiaries.
Table 5: Level of Intangible Assets, OLS Fixed E↵ects, 2005-2011
Dependent Variable: Log Intangible Assets
(1) (2)
Baseline Firm Controls
PBa*postIntro 0.04 -0.19
(0.19) (0.15)
PBa*postIntroDE -0.09 0.12
(0.21) (0.18)
lTurnover 0.40***
(0.04)
lFixedAssets 0.58***
(0.03)
Observations 43,640 37,248
R-squared 0.03 0.144
Number of firms 7,647 7,439
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Year*Country Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6 Interpretation
My findings provide some support to concerns about potential negative spillovers
of preferential IP-Regimes in Europe. While I do find significant negative e↵ects
of indirect patent box access on reported profit levels, I do not observe an e↵ect
on intangible asset holdings among Austrian and German subsidiaries following the
introduction of Patent Boxes abroad.
The latter observation might be partly linked to legal restrictions on asset relo-
cations. In many cases, there are non-negligible tax costs resulting from ownership
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transfers. Where exit taxes apply, the net present value of an asset needs to be cal-
culated based on a benchmark below true market value to obtain a favorable overall
situation from an MNEs perspective. Relocating intangible assets through direct
sales may thus often be a sub-optimal strategy, particularly when there is potential
for exit taxation.11 A more remunerating approach might be a gradual transfer of
ownership: registration of new patents in low tax Countries and reliance on contract
R&D, with the taxpayer in a low tax jurisdiction taking the formal risk of the de-
velopment, thus ensuring that income qualifies for preferential treatment (see Evers
and Spengel (2014)). Bo¨hm et al. (2012), for instance, find that 8% of patent appli-
cations at the European Patent O ce have a di↵erent inventor and applicant origin.
Such strategies result in a gradual re-allocation of intangible assets and are thus un-
likely to be picked up in the panel I have assembled. Moreover, firms are likely most
sensible to corporate tax rates with respect to the IP that has the highest earnings
potential. It is thus probable that the quality of IP is critical in understanding e↵ects
(Bo¨hm et al. (2012)). The lack of di↵erentiation when using the balance sheet item
intangible assets in this study may therefore be too general to capture e↵ects on
intangible asset endowments of subsidiaries in Austria and Germany.
To take advantage of preferential tax rates in Patent Box jurisdictions, a fruit-
ful short-term strategy may be the overvaluation of assets that are already located
in these jurisdictions. This seems plausible, given that intangible assets have been
identified as an important driver of observable profit shifting (Beer and Loeprick
(2014)). Tax administrators often highlight related party royalty flows among key
profit-shifting risk areas.12 Licensing arrangements may thus provide room for allo-
cating profits into IP-Box jurisdictions without transferring legal ownership. Such
behavior could explain the finding of a significant reduction in reported profit levels
among a liates, in particular in Austria, when they obtain indirect access to pref-
erential IP regimes. Consequently, there seems to be some scope for administrative
mitigation measures in Austria to enforce the proper valuation of intangible assets
held abroad.
Di↵erences in the observed country e↵ects may be due to a broad range of factors,
including the legal framework, available administrative resources, and di↵erences in
the composition of value chains in Austria and Germany. Notably, German authori-
ties have been more proactive in introducing anti-avoidance provisions. For instance,
German CFC rules are among the oldest globally,13 whereas Austria has not yet intro-
11With the value of assets determined on an arm’s length basis.
12See, for instance: Australian Taxation O ce (2013): Overview of international profit-shifting
risks and activities in the ATO.
13And thus have a range of important weaknesses (see Kraft et al. (2014)).
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duced similar provisions. Germany has also introduced strict regulations regarding
the transfer of intangible assets in 2008.14
7 Conclusion
Policy innovations to encourage R&D investments and attract intangible assets have
drawn a lot of attention in recent debates on potentially harmful tax competition in
the EU. This paper provides initial analysis investigating potential spillover e↵ects
of preferential IP regimes in Europe. Instead of measuring the e↵ect of preferential
regimes on the tax base and stock of intangible assets located in countries that have
introduced Patent Boxes, I assess the e↵ect of new patent box regimes on a liates
operating in Germany and Austria. The results of a di↵erence-in-di↵erences frame-
work indicate a reduction in reported pre-tax profitability levels among Austrian
and German firms. I do not, however, find significant evidence of the relocation of
intangible assets among these firms.
These findings suggest that MNE tax planning in response to preferential IP
regimes may be more reliant on manipulating the value estimates and associated
license and royalty payments, rather than on the transfer of legal ownership rights.
There is thus some scope for administrative mitigation measures in enforcing proper
valuation of intangible assets held abroad.
14Austria has, however, more recently taken notable steps to protect its corporate tax base. In
2014, Austria introduced a limitation on the deductibility of internal license and royalty payments
(Lizenzschranke), denying deductions when the income is taxed at a rate below 10 percent in the
recipient’s jurisdiction. The concept is similar to thin capitalization rules.
17
References
Beer, S. and J. Loeprick (2014). Profit shifting: drivers of transfer (mis)pricing and
the potential of countermeasures. International Tax and Public Finance, 1–26.
Bloom, N., R. Gri th, and J. Van Reenen (2002). Do R&D tax credits work?
Evidence from a panel of countries 1979–1997. Journal of Public Economics 85 (1),
1–31.
Bo¨hm, T., T. Karkinsky, and N. Riedel (2012). The Impact of Corporate Taxes on
R&D and Patent Holdings. SBS Conference Paper , 1–42.
Dischinger, M. and N. Riedel (2011). Corporate taxes and the location of intangible
assets within multinational firms. Journal of Public Economics 95 (7-8), 691–707.
Evers, L., H. Miller, and C. Spengel (2014). Intellectual property box regimes:
e↵ective tax rates and tax policy considerations. International Tax and Public
Finance, 1–29.
Evers, L. and C. Spengel (2014). E↵ective tax rates under IP tax planning. ZEW
Discussion Paper No. 14-111.
Gri th, R., H. Miller, and M. O’Connell (2014). Ownership of intellectual property
and corporate taxation. Journal of Public Economics 112 (C), 12–23.
Hall, B. and J. Van Reenen (2000). How e↵ective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A
review of the evidence. Research Policy .
IMF (2014). Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation. Technical report.
Karkinsky, T. and N. Riedel (2012). Corporate taxation and the choice of patent
location within multinational firms. Journal of Public Economics 88 (1), 176–185.
Keen, M. (2001). Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful.
National Tax Journal 4, 752–62.
Kraft, G., T. Moser, and S. Hentschel (2014). The German CFC Rules: Overview,
Deficits and Reform Proposals. Intertax 42 (5), 334–338.
OECD (2013). Supporting Investment in Knowledge Capital, Growth and Innovation.
OECD Publishing.
OECD (2014). Countering Harmful Tax Practices More E↵ectively, Taking into
Account Transparency and Substance. OECD Publishing.
18
